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Hedging with “Financial Weapons of Mass 
Destruction”:  Cleaning Up the Fallout of Treating All 
Derivative Transactions Between Bank Affiliates the 
Same.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Derivatives are one of the most misunderstood products in our 
financial markets today.1  Much has been made of speculative derivative 
products, as they are often cited as causes of the Financial Crisis of 2008 
(“the financial crisis”)2 and have been made infamous by Hollywood 
movies3 and congressional hearings.4  Warren Buffet famously called 
derivatives “financial weapons of mass destruction.”5  These financial 
products played a role in exacerbating the financial crisis,6 in particular 
AIG’s spectacular credit default swap losses and its resulting bailout.7  
The outcome of such a dramatic event during the financial crisis has 
 
 1. Shelly Antoniewicz, Derivatives—Please Don’t Let Them Be Misunderstood, INV. 
CO. INST. (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_16_derivatives_imf. 
 2. See Kimberly Amadeo, Role of Derivatives in Creating Mortgage Crisis: The True 
Cause of the Mortgage Crisis, THE BALANCE (June 30, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/
role-of-derivatives-in-creating-mortgage-crisis-3970477 (“The real cause of the 2008 
financial crisis was the proliferation of unregulated derivatives in the last decade.”). 
 3. See, e.g., THE BIG SHORT (Plan B Entertainment & Regency Enterprise 2015) 
(explaining credit default swap’s role in the Financial Crisis). 
 4. See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html 
(describing the congressional testimony of Alan Greenspan in the wake of the financial crisis). 
 5. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to the 
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 15 (Feb. 21, 2003). 
 6. See Mark Gongloff, Derivatives are Weapons of Slow Economic Destruction: Study, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 14, 2013, 1:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/14/
derivatives-weapons-destruction_n_3442229.html (“[T]he financial crisis showed that 
derivatives make the system way more dangerous by encouraging these banks and investors 
to pile up more and more risk.”). 
 7. See Bruce Tuckman, In Defense of Derivatives: From Beer to Financial Crisis, CATO 
INST. CTR. FOR MONETARY & FIN. ALT. POLICY ANALYSIS, No. 781 (Sept. 29, 2015) https://
object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa781.pdf ([AIG’s] failure and bailout were due 
to losses partly from credit default swaps and partly—and comparably—from nonderivative 
mortgage products.”). 
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caused derivatives to be generally seen as risky and dangerous financial 
products.8   
However, not all derivative transactions are like the highly 
speculative trades that helped bring the financial markets to the brink of 
collapse.9  Common derivative products, such as futures, forwards, 
options, and swaps, are regularly used in risk-mitigating transactions to 
hedge against investments in all industries.10  These hedging derivatives, 
as opposed to speculative derivatives, can reduce losses when goods, 
currency, securities, or resources a company relies on fall in value.11  
These hedging transactions are common practice for financial and non-
financial institutions as a way to limit their losses, and are a major 
component of risk management for many companies,12 including Warren 
Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway.13   
Following the financial bailout of AIG and others, Congress 
sought to institute new regulation to restrict speculative derivative 
transactions.14  Passed in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) addressed many of the 
speculative uses of derivatives that were seen as contributors to the 
financial crisis.15  Dodd-Frank actively distinguishes transactions for 
 
 8. See Ron Hera, Forget about Housing, The Real Cause of the Crisis was OTC 
Derivatives, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 11, 2010, 2:50 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
bubble-derivatives-otc-2010-5 (“From the perspective of those outside the bubble, the 
explosion of OTC derivatives is a mania.”). 
 9. See Craig Donofrio, Maybe Derivatives Aren’t So Bad After All, THE STREET (Apr. 
3, 2014, 8:04 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/12785552/1/maybe-derivatives-arent-
so-bad-after-all.html (describing a study that has shown that derivatives for hedging purposes 
actually increase a company’s value). 
 10. Kimberly Amadeo, Derivatives, Their Risks and Their Rewards?, THE BALANCE 
(Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-derivatives-3305833. 
 11. See Tuckman, supra note 7, at 2 (“Derivatives enable those enterprises to run large-
scale operations without bearing commensurately large business risks that could threaten their 
survival.”). 
 12. See Tuckman, supra note 7, at 1 (“The vast majority of large businesses use 
derivatives to hedge their business risks.”). 
 13. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Column, Derivatives, as Accused by Buffett, N. Y. TIMES 
(March 14, 2011, 9:17 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/derivatives-as-
accused-by-buffett/?_r=0 (“In the fourth quarter [of 2011] alone, Berkshire made $222 
million on derivatives.”). 
 14. Shahien Nasiripour, Derivatives Just “A Sophisticated Form of Gambling,” 
U.S. Senators Say; Propose Bill Allowing State Gambling Laws to Apply , 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 
09/11/10/derivatives-just-a-sophis_n_352994.html. 
 15. See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DODD-FRANK SPOTLIGHT: DERIVATIVES, https:/
/www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml (last modified May 4, 2015). 
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speculative purposes from those used for hedging in a number of its 
sections.16  However, it does not differentiate between the two in its 
changes to Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act (“Section 23A”)17 and 
Regulation W, the statute and Federal Reserve regulation governing 
transactions between Federal Reserve member banks (“member banks”) 
and their affiliates.18   
The amendment to Section 23A in the Dodd-Frank Act requires 
that all derivative transactions with bank affiliates, including those used 
for hedging purposes, are to be considered “covered transactions” to the 
extent that the transaction causes a member bank or a subsidiary to have 
credit exposure to the affiliate.19  If these transactions create credit 
exposure, the amendment requires that the transactions meet certain 
qualitative, quantitative, and collateral standards set forth in Section 
23A.20  These standards, such as limiting transactions between member 
banks with any of their affiliates to those transactions of less than 10% of 
the bank’s available capital, affect how some banks manage their risk and 
could increase the systemic risk of banking institutions.21   
Despite the negative effect of these standards, the Federal 
Reserve Board (“FRB”) has not yet revised Regulation W to define 
“credit exposure” in light of the passage of Dodd-Frank and the 
amendments to Section 23A.22 The FRB should revise Regulation W so 
that the interpretation of  “credit exposure” is viewed strictly, ensuring 
the standards of covered transactions under Section 23A do not apply to 
derivative transactions that are made for good-faith hedging and risk 
management purposes.23  Such an interpretation would alleviate the 
 
 16. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(C) (2016)) (distinguishing between 
hedging and speculative proprietary trading); id. §716, 15 U.S.C. §8305(a) (repealed 2014) 
(exempting financial institutions from being considered swap dealers if swaps used for 
hedging purposes only). 
 17. Dodd-Frank § 608(a), 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7)(G) (2016). 
 18. 12 C.F.R. § 223.33 (2017). 
 19. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7) (2016). 
 20. Id. § 371c; see infra Part III.A. 
 21. James I. Kaplan & Corbin J. Morris, Dodd-Frank Amendments to Sec 23A Are 
Problematic: Part 1, LAW360 (Jan. 7, 2014, 1:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
498401/dodd-frank-amendments-to-sec-23a-are-problematic-part-1. 
 22. Regulation W – The Operational Challenges, ACCENTURE, http://financeandriskbl 
og.accenture.com/regulatory-insights/regulatory-compliance/regulation-w-the-operational-
challenges (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
 23. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (emphasizing that interpretation of ‘credit 
exposure’ may lessen impact). 
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negative impacts of the Section 23A while also remaining consistent with 
Dodd-Frank.24  
This Note proceeds in six parts.  Part II details what derivative 
transactions are and how they are used in affiliate transactions.25  Part III 
discusses how derivative transactions are regulated under both Section 
23A and Regulation W, and the changes made to these regulations by 
Dodd-Frank.26  Part IV describes the negative impacts of the changes and 
how an exception for hedging transactions would mitigate these 
unintended consequences.27  Part V discusses how the FRB can craft such 
an exception by narrowly defining credit exposure under Regulation W.28  
Part VI encourages adoption of this exception and concludes the Note.29 
II. DERIVATIVES AND AFFILIATE TRANSACTIONS 
A. What is a Derivative? 
Financial derivatives are defined as “financial instruments that 
are linked to a specific financial instrument or indicator or commodity, 
and through which specific financial risks can be traded in financial 
markets in their own right.”30  In other words, a derivative is a contract 
between two parties that commit to exchange goods, such as cash or 
securities, if the underlying asset meets a specified metric.31  Such metrics 
include interest rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity, credit, 
and equity prices.32  Derivatives that are tied to these types of metrics 
include structured debt obligations, swaps, futures, options, caps, floors, 
collars, forwards, and various combinations thereof.33  These products are 
 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. See infra Part IV. 
 28. See infra Part V. 
 29. See infra Part VI. 
 30. Financial Derivatives, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/
fd/index.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
 31. See Tuckman, supra note 7, (explaining how derivatives work through the example 
of a brewery). 
 32. Derivatives, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ 
.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/index-derivatives.html (last visited 
on Sept. 17, 2017). 
 33. See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling? 
Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital 
Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987 (1992) (in-depth derivative product description). 
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often attractive to many companies, banks, and other financial institutions 
as they generally do not require any upfront payment and are written in a 
legal form that allows for swift remedial action in the event of a default 
without the approval of a bankruptcy court.34  Derivatives are generally 
transacted for two purposes: hedging and speculation.35   
In the context of a derivative transaction used for hedging 
purposes, the derivative traded is usually tied to an underlying asset that 
could create a loss for the hedging company if the asset’s price rises or 
falls.36  A classic example of a hedging transaction would be an interest 
rate swap.37  An interest rate swap is an exchange of interest rates between 
two financial instruments.38  Generally, a banker owns a product of which 
the rate is variable or floating, and the banker would rather have a fixed 
rate.39  In that case, an investor will offer to make a deal: if the floating 
rate stays above a certain specified rate, the investor will pay the banker 
the difference between the specified rate and the floating rate.40  
However, if the rate falls below the specified rate, the banker will have to 
pay the investor the difference.41  This essentially allows the banker to 
change the floating interest rate into a fixed rate, “hedging” the risk of 
any rise in interest rates.42  The other purpose of a derivative transaction 
is speculation.43  An investor speculates that interest rates will drop, so 
he or she will bet that over the long run, the variable rate will be lower 
that the fixed interest rate they offered to the banker, and he or she will 
 
 34. Tuckman, supra note 7, at 2. 
 35. See Sam Peterson, There’s a Derivative in Your Cereal, THE ATLANTIC (July 29, 
2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/07/theres-a-derivative-in-your-
cereal/60582 (comparing speculative over-the-counter derivative products with hedging 
derivatives that a vast majority of large companies use). 
 36. See id. (explaining that derivatives are often tied to goods and services businesses 
rely on for profits). 
 37. Interest Rate Swaps, PIMCO, https://global.pimco.com/en-gbl/resources/education/
understanding-interest-rate-swaps (last visited Oct. 7, 2017). 
 38. See Hera, supra note 8 (describing an interest rate swap transaction). 
 39. See Tuckman, supra note 7 (explaining how derivatives work through the example 
of a brewery). 
 40. See Hera, supra note 8 (describing an interest rate swap transaction). 
 41. See Tuckman, supra note 7 (explaining how derivatives work through the example 
of a brewery). 
 42. See Tuckman, supra note 7 (giving the example of a brewer hedging the price of 
wheat futures to maintain a consistent price of beer over a long period of time without 
worrying about the rise and fall of the price of wheat). 
 43. See Hera, supra note 8 (describing the dangers of speculative derivatives). 
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end up receiving more money from the banker than he or she will have to 
pay to them.44 
Because they appeal both to risk-averse and risk-seeking 
investors, derivative transactions have an enormous impact on the 
American financial system, as most large companies use derivatives for 
one or both purposes.45  A 2009 survey found that 94% of Fortune Global 
500 companies used derivatives.46  Another study earlier in the decade 
found that 88% of almost 7,000 nonfinancial firms with listed stock 
across forty-seven countries used derivatives.47  Of the more than 2,000 
nonfinancial firms in the United States in that same study, 94% used 
derivatives.48 
B. Derivative Transactions Between Banks and Their Affiliates 
Derivative transactions are not only entered into between 
unaffiliated investors, but also transactions between affiliates,49 which are 
commonly used as a hedging mechanism by many large, multinational 
financial institutions and banks.50  These transactions generally arise 
either when an institution finds it unfavorable to hedge directly due to the 
risk generated by a transaction or if the institution is unable to hedge the 
 
 44. Hera, supra note 8. 
 45. Tuckman, supra note 7. 
 46. ISDA Research Notes, ISDA (Apr. 23, 2009), https://www.isda.org/a/yPDDE/isda-
research-notes2.pdf. 
 47. See Tuckman, supra note 7, at 2 (citing Söhnke Bartram, Corporate Hedging and 
Speculation with Derivatives, (2015), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=891190.). 
 48. See Tuckman, supra note 7, at 2 (citing Söhnke Bartram, Corporate Hedging and 
Speculation with Derivatives, (2015), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=891190.). 
 49. “Affiliate” with respect to a member bank under Section 23A means: (1) Parent 
companies; (2) Companies under common control by a parent company; (3) Companies 
under other common control; (4) Companies with interlocking directorates; (5) Sponsored 
and advised companies; (6) Investment Companies in which the member bank or affiliate is 
an investment advisor; (7) Depository institution subsidiaries; (8) Financial subsidiaries; 
(9) Companies held under merchant banking or insurance company investment authority; (10) 
Partnerships associated with the member bank or affiliate; (11) Subsidiaries of affiliates; and 
(12) Other companies the FRB finds appropriate to label as an affiliate. 12 C.F.R. § 223.2 
(2017). 
 50. See ERNST & YOUNG, DODD–FRANK AND INTER–AFFILIATE TRADING OF 
DERIVATIVES, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Dodd%E2%80%93Frank-
and-inter%E2%80%93affi-liate-trading-of-derivatives/$FILE/EY-Dodd%E2%80%93Frank-
and-inter%E2%80%93affi-liate-trading-of-derivatives.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) 
(“[M]any large multinational companies have moved toward centralizing their hedging and 
derivatives trading operations through the use of [centralized derivative holding entity].”). 
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risk directly because it is not authorized to hold the hedging asset.51  In 
either case the institution may have an affiliate acquire the hedging asset 
instead.52  The institution would then engage in a bridging derivative 
transaction between itself and the affiliate holding the hedging asset.53  
The advantages of such a transaction are numerous, including having a 
comprehensive view of risk and liquidity across portfolios, centralized 
risk management, savings in collateral posted, reduced transaction costs, 
and other tax and accounting benefits.54  This type of transaction also 
limits systemic risk by insuring against the failure of the underlying asset 
within the overall company structure, rather than transacting with 
excessive unaffiliated entities.55  
Other derivative transactions between a member bank and its 
affiliates are affiliate-driven.56  To accomplish its risk management goals, 
an institution’s affiliate may enter into an interest rate or foreign-
exchange derivative transaction with the institution.57  For example, an 
institution’s holding company may hold a substantial amount of floating-
rate assets, but issue fixed-rate debt securities to obtain cheaper funding.58  
The holding company may then enter into a fixed-to- floating interest-
rate swap with its subsidiary member bank to reduce the holding 
company’s interest-rate risk.59  This would result in the bank being 
protected from any changes in interest rates and normalizing its cash-
flows, thereby meeting its risk management goals.60 
  
 
 51. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SUPERVISION MANUAL, 
INTERCOMPANY TRANSACTIONS 20 (2008). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 50, at 2. 
 55. See SCOTT CAMMARN ET AL., CADWALADER WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, CLIENT 
ALERT: THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S IMPACT ON AFFILIATE TRANSACTIONS (Apr. 21, 2011), http:/
/www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/the-dodd-frank-acts-impact-on-
affiliate-transactions#_ftn23 (explaining that less systemic risk created by using affiliated 
derivative transactions than unaffiliated ones). 
 56. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20. 
 57. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20. 
 58. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20. 
 59. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20. 
 60. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20. 
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III. REGULATING DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN BANKS AND 
THEIR AFFILIATES 
A. Section 23A Provisions  
With the establishment of federal deposit insurance during the 
Great Depression, there was a fear of bank runs caused by ill-advised 
banking transactions costing the government billions in insurance 
payouts.61  One method of protecting banks from misusing funds was to 
limit their transactions with their affiliates.62  Section 23A was passed by 
Congress through the United States Banking Act of 1933 as an addition 
to the Federal Reserve Act of 1933, which regulates affiliate transactions 
of member banks.63  Section 23A requires that certain “covered 
transactions” between Federal Reserve member banks and their affiliates 
are subject to qualitative limits, quantitative standards, and collateral 
requirements.64  Covered transactions include numerous types of 
transactions, such as loans or extensions of credit, purchases of 
investment securities by either the parent or affiliate, and securities 
transactions that would cause a member bank or subsidiary to have credit 
exposure to an affiliate, among others.65  
The limits on a member bank’s covered transactions require that 
transactions with any single affiliate cannot exceed 10% of the bank’s 
capital, and transactions with all bank affiliates cannot exceed 20% of the 
bank’s capital.66  An extension of credit by the bank to an affiliate and 
any guarantee on behalf of an affiliate must be secured by a defined 
amount of collateral.67  Further, all covered transactions between a bank 
 
 61. See Julia Maues, Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), FED. RESERVE HISTORY (Nov. 
22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/glass_steagall_act (describing the 
reasoning behind many of the provisions of Glass-Steagall). 
 62. See id. (stating tighter regulations were passed on member banks, including their 
affiliates). 
 63. Id. 
 64. The definition of affiliate under this statute is extremely broad, as it includes parent 
companies, companies under common control of parent company, companies under other 
common control, companies with interlocking directorates, sponsored and advised 
companies, investment companies for which the member bank or its affiliate serve as an 
investment adviser or has control over, depository institution subsidiaries, financial 
subsidiaries, and companies held under merchant banking or insurance company investment 
authority. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1) (2016). 
 65. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7) (2016). 
 66. Id. § 371c(a)(1)(A-B). 
 67. Id. § 371c(c). 
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and its affiliate must be on terms and conditions that are consistent with 
safe and sound banking practices.68  Finally, a bank is generally 
prohibited from purchasing “low-quality assets”69 from its affiliates.70  
These standards are subject to exemption,71 which include loans or 
guarantees to an affiliate which are fully secured by U.S. government 
obligations,72 the purchase of assets with a readily available market 
quotation at the quoted price from an affiliate,73 or the deposit of funds in 
the affiliate bank in the ordinary course of correspondent business.74  
Congress later added additional restrictions to affiliate 
transactions.75  Non-member banks and covered insured thrifts were 
included under the restrictions of Section 23A.76  Additionally, in 1987, 
Congress added Section 23B, a twin section to Section 23A.77  Under 
Section 23B, covered transactions must be conducted as an arm’s length 
transaction78 or in good faith as if it were done between non-affiliated 
companies.79  
 
 68. Sound banking practices requires that the bank shall consider, as appropriate, the 
interest rate, credit, liquidity, price, foreign exchange, transaction, compliance, strategic, and 
reputation risks presented by a proposed activity, and the particular activities undertaken by 
the bank must be appropriate for that bank. Further, the bank must believe that all obligations 
can be met, as well maintaining records of transactions for examination purposes. 12 C.F.R. 
§1.5 (2017). 
 69. “Low-quality assets” are defined as: an asset (including a security) classified as 
“substandard,” “doubtful,” or “loss,” or treated as “special mention” or “other transfer risk 
problems,” either in the most recent report of examination or inspection of 
an affiliate prepared by either a Federal or State supervisory agency or in any internal 
classification system used by the member bank or the affiliate (including an asset that 
receives a rating that is substantially equivalent to “classified” or “special mention” in the 
internal system of the member bank or affiliate); an asset in a nonaccrual status; an asset on 
which principal or interest payments are more than thirty days past due; an asset whose terms 
have been renegotiated or compromised due to the deteriorating financial condition of the 
obligor; and an asset acquired through foreclosure, repossession, or otherwise in satisfaction 
of a debt previously contracted, if the asset has not yet been reviewed in an examination or 
inspection. 12 C.F.R. § 223.3(v) (2017). 
 70. 12 U.S.C. §371c(a)(3) (2016). 
 71. Id. § 371c(a)(4). 
 72. Id. § 371c(d)(4). 
 73. Id. § 371c(d)(6). 
 74. Id. § 371c(d)(3). 
 75. Staff Letter to Board of Governors of Federal Reserve, Regulations implementing 
Sections 23A and 23B of the Fed. Reserve Act (Apr. 24, 2001). 
 76. Id. 
 77. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (2016). 
 78. Id. § 371c-1(a)(2)(A). 
 79. Id. § 371c-1(a)(1)(B). 
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B. Regulation W 
With the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) in 
1999,80 member banks had a far greater breadth of transactions available 
between themselves and their affiliates.81  GLBA repealed provisions of 
the Glass-Steagall Act that prohibited depository institutions and 
investment banks from consolidating; under GLBA, a bank holding 
company could now have both investment banks and depository 
institutions as subsidiaries and affiliates.82  This change drastically 
deregulated the banking industry.83  A flood of mergers and acquisitions 
followed the passage of the bill, giving rise to many of our modern-day 
banking behemoths, such as J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Bank of 
America.84  
After GLBA became law, Section 23A became the central 
statutory mechanism for protecting depository institutions from the 
potentially risky activities of their affiliates.85  Within GLBA, the FRB 
was required to adopt rules to address “credit exposure arising out of 
derivative transactions” between banks and their affiliates.86  In response, 
the FRB issued Regulation W,87 a regulatory implementation of both 
Section 23A and 23B.88  Regulation W codifies various FRB decisions 
made in prior years and clarifies interpretations of the statute in light of 
the enactment of GLBA.89  Regulation W specifies certain exceptions and 
exemptions to Section 23A, excluding derivative transactions from the 
 
 80. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub.L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 81. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1707 (2011) 
(“[T]hose more numerous affiliated entities engaged in a much broader range of newly 
permissible financial activities.”). 
 82. See Omarova, supra note 82, at 1706 (“The enactment and implementation of the 
GLB Act . . . finally removed the Glass-Steagall’s Act prohibition on combining commercial 
and investment banking under common corporate ownership.”). 
 83. See David Leonhardt, Washington’s Invisible Hand, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Sept. 
26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/magazine/28wwln-reconsider.html (“[I]t’s 
easily the biggest piece of financial deregulation in recent decades.”). 
 84. See id. (“Thus were born Citigroup, Bank of America and J. P. Morgan Chase, 
behemoths that owned bank branches, bought and sold stocks and shepherded corporate 
mergers.”). 
 85. Omarova, supra note 81, at 1683. 
 86. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(f)(3)(A) (2016). 
 87. 12 C.F.R. § 223 (2017). 
 88. Omarova, supra note 81, at 1697-98. 
 89. Omarova, supra note 81, at 1698. 
  
2018] AFFILIATE DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS 391 
definition of covered transactions, but does not define “credit 
exposure.”90 
Under Regulation W, banks are required to establish and maintain 
internal policies and procedures regarding their credit exposure to 
affiliates under derivatives transactions, rather than comply with the 
covered transaction requirements.91  These policies include monitoring 
and controlling the credit exposure by imposing appropriate credit limits, 
mark-to-market requirements, and collateral requirements by the member 
banks.92  Notably, the FRB did consider subjecting derivative 
transactions to the standards of covered transactions, but felt that their 
reliance on bank-designed policies and procedures, Section 23B’s arm-
length requirements, and active examiner supervision were enough to 
regulate bank-affiliate derivatives.93  
C. Section 23A Amendments under Dodd-Frank 
In response to the financial crisis, Congress sought to drastically 
change the regulatory atmosphere of the financial industry, specifically 
in how derivatives were regulated.94  As derivatives were widely regarded 
as a cause of the financial crisis,95 several derivative-focused provisions 
were included in Dodd-Frank.96  In particular, Dodd-Frank significantly 
changed how derivative transactions were regulated between affiliates.97  
 
 90. See Transactions Between Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. 76560, 76588 
(Dec. 12, 2002) (“The Board is not prepared at this time to subject credit exposure arising 
from bank-affiliate derivatives to all the requirements of section 23A.”) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 
§ 223.33 (2017)). 
 91. 12 C.F.R. § 223.33 (2017). 
 92. To the Officer in Charge of Supervision and Appropriate Supervisory and 
Examination Staff at each Federal Reserve Bank and to Domestic and Foreign Banking 
Organizations Supervised by the Federal Reserve from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve, Docket No. SR 03-2 (Jan. 9, 2003). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Marcy Gordon, Congress Urged to Stiffen Rules for Derivatives Trading, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2010), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/congress-urged-to-stiffen-
rules-for-derivatives-trading/. 
 95. Amadeo, supra note 2. 
 96. Dodd-Frank, §§ 712, 716, 721-722, 731, 764; see generally PAULA S. GREENMAN ET 
AL., SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, CLIENT ALERT: REGULATION OF OVER-
THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES UNDER THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT https://files.skadden.com/newsletters%2FFSR_A_Regulation_of_Over-
the-Counter_Derivatives.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2017) (detailing specific derivative 
transaction regulations in Dodd-Frank). 
 97. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20. 
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Despite the FRB’s reluctance to do so when issuing Regulation W, Dodd-
Frank amended Section 23A to include under covered transactions a 
“derivative transaction . . . with an affiliate, to the extent that the 
transaction causes a member bank or a subsidiary to have credit exposure 
to the affiliate.”98  The bill does not make any reference to the purpose of 
the derivative transaction, choosing instead to regulate both hedging and 
speculative derivative transactions in the same way.99  Electing not to 
exempt hedging activities from the same standards as speculative trades 
was inconsistent with other separate provisions in the Act.100  
Additionally, Dodd-Frank declines to address the definition of “credit 
exposure,” choosing to leave it to regulatory authorities.101 
Because the definition was left to regulatory authorities, 
regulatory interpretation was needed to determine the definition of “credit 
exposure” following the Act’s passage and implementation.102  The FRB 
discussed a “consistent definition” of credit exposure in contemplating 
the expected amendment to Regulation W to follow the Section 23A 
changes,103 but such a definition was never implemented.104  Rather, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) introduced methods 
of determining credit exposure on a quantitative basis for derivative 
affiliate transactions that do not include a distinction between speculative 
and hedging derivative transactions.105  Thus, without any regulatory 
clarification from the FRB, speculative and hedging derivative 
transactions are treated equally for the purposes of affiliate 
transactions.106  
 
 98. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7)(f) (2016). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(C) (2016)) (distinguishing between 
hedging and speculative proprietary trading); id. §716, 15 U.S.C. §8305(a) (repealed 2014) 
(exempting financial institutions from being considered swap dealers if derivatives used 
swaps for hedging purposes). 
 101. See Omarova, supra note 81, at 1765 (“[A]gency action will ultimately determine 
whether this provision of the Dodd-Frank Act affects any real change in large banking 
organizations’ derivatives dealing and trading.”). 
 102. Omarova, supra note 81, at 1765. 
 103. Chris Bruce, Fed Staff Aiming for Consistent Definition on Derivatives-Related 
Credit Exposures, [2013] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 07 (Aug. 13, 2013). 
 104. ACCENTURE supra note 22. 
 105. 12 C.F.R. §§ 32, 159, 160 (2017). 
 106. CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55. 
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IV. A NECESSARY EXEMPTION 
Treating all derivative transactions equally under Section 23A, 
regardless of purpose, was a mistake by Congress.107  Given speculative 
derivative transactions’ negative effect on the economy during the 
financial crisis, more regulatory oversight was reasonable.108  However, 
holding hedging derivative transactions to the same standards under 
Section 23A as those for speculative purposes limits banks’ flexibility in 
risk management, increases the overall systemic risk of derivatives, and 
creates costly compliance issues.109  Exempting these hedging derivative 
transactions would alleviate these issues.110   
A. More Flexible Risk Management 
Treating hedging and speculative derivative transactions the 
same way under Section 23A undermines banks’ efforts to ensure safe 
and reliable risk management.111  The misuse of derivative transactions 
leading up to the financial crisis created a great deal of mistrust in all 
derivative-related transactions.112  However, this mistrust should not 
extend to derivative transactions with affiliates for hedging purposes, as 
they are a central element in many companies’ risk management policies, 
particularly those of banks and other financial institutions.113  The 
inclusion of these transactions under the covered transaction standards of 
Section 23A decreases the flexibility and usefulness of these risk 
management procedures.114  
 
 107. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (discussing problems with the amendments to 
Section 23A). 
 108. Mark Gongloff, Derivatives are a Weapon of Slow Economic Destruction: Study, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 14 2014, 1:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/14/
derivatives-weapons-destruction_n_3442229.html. (explaining the downsides of derivatives). 
 109. Infra Part IV.A–C. 
 110. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55, at 9 (questioning why Congress did not include 
hedging transactions as exempt from covered transactions as they had in Volker and Lincoln 
Amendments). 
 111. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21. 
 112. See Gordon, supra note 94 (showing an example of the pressure put on Congress to 
increase regulation on derivatives due to their supposed role in crisis). 
 113. See supra Part II.B. 
 114. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21. 
  
394 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 22 
Covered transactions under Section 23A are limited by the 10% 
limitation imposed by Section 23A.115  This limitation’s negative effect 
is best shown by how it impacts hedging transactions with a central 
derivative entity.116  Many member banks have established a non-bank 
central entity for all derivatives business for risk management 
purposes.117  In this risk management structure, bridging derivatives are 
transacted between the central entity and the bank when a trade is made 
with an outside company.118  This protects the parent member bank 
against the risk of the trade, as the affiliate takes on the investment risk 
for which it is better equipped than the bank.119  These transactions 
between the parent bank and central entity are considered affiliate 
derivative transactions and as such may be subject to the standards of 
covered transactions under Section 23A if they are deemed to create a 
credit exposure to the affiliate.120  These standards constrain a bank’s 
bridge derivative transactions with the parent bank, limiting the number 
of hedging transactions that they would otherwise undertake.121  Because 
of these constraints, banks may either have to completely change their 
risk management protections or use a similar hedging strategy with a third 
party.122   
Discouraging banks from engaging in derivative hedging 
transactions between affiliates limits their risk management flexibility.123  
Flexibility is beneficial to banks as it allows a more bank-specific risk 
management approach.124  The flexibility to include these transactions in 
a risk management strategy for financial entities can create a more 
 
 115. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (“Such common structures (and there are others, 
of course) now are severely limited by the 10 percent limitation imposed by Section 23A.”). 
 116. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21. 
 117. AZAM H. AZIZ ET AL., SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, CLIENT ALERT: DODD-FRANK 
ACT: DERIVATIVES AS CREDIT EXTENSIONS OF BANKS (Aug. 16, 2010) 
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/files/newsinsights/publications/2010/08/doddfrank-
act—derivatives-as-credit-extensions-__/files/view-full-memo-doddfrank-act—derivatives-
as-cre__/fileattachment/fia081710derivativesascreditextensionsofbanks.pdf. 
 118. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20. 
 119. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52. 
 120. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 21. 
 121. See AZIZ ET AL., supra note 117, at 15 (“The 10-percent limit in many instances could 
constrain a bank’s back-to-back derivatives with a nonbank that serves as the central 
management point depending on the Fed’s definition of ‘credit exposure.’”). 
 122. AZIZ ET AL., supra note 117, at 15. 
 123. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21. 
 124. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 50 (encouraging each company to design a risk 
management strategy that is the most beneficial to themselves). 
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comprehensive view of risk and liquidity across portfolios, centralized 
risk management, savings in collateral posted, reduced transactions costs, 
and other tax and accounting benefits.125  Without allowing an exemption 
for risk-mitigating hedging activities done in good faith under Section 
23A, member banks would be unable to structure their risk management 
policies in order to meet institution-specific needs.126  
For example, a financial institution may reasonably feel that, due 
to specific investments, a risk management structure that includes 
derivative transactions with a central affiliate entity is the best way to 
hedge their risk.127  However, if credit exposure is defined broadly, 
transactions between institution and parent will be subject to the 
restrictions of section 23A, regardless of the transaction’s purpose.128  
This may cause the financial institution to not implement this strategy, 
despite believing it is best for its company, due to Section 23A’s 
regulatory requirements.129  In that way, Section 23A is discouraging 
institutions from following what they believe to be the best risk 
management for its investments.130  However, if hedging transactions 
were exempted from the standards of Section 23A, such a company 
would be much more likely to use the most advantageous risk 
management strategy without fear of compliance or regulatory issues.131   
Eliminating the requirement for derivative transactions for 
hedging purposes to follow the standards of Section 23A would not 
change or limit other restrictions on derivatives within the Dodd-Frank 
Act.132  Rather, this would only permit more flexible risk management 
strategies without subjecting them to unnecessary and limiting 
 
 125. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 50. 
 126. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 50. 
 127. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20 (explaining 
that banks often use central affiliate entities to hedge risk). 
 128. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2016). 
 129. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (explaining the regulatory requirements that 
would keep banks away from hedging with affiliate derivative transactions.). 
 130. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (emphasizing that because of amendments, if a 
bank chooses to follow such a risk management strategy, it is now severely limited by the 
10% limitation imposed by Section 23A). 
 131. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (explaining the banks would use such strategies 
if not for the problematic changes to 23A) 
 132. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(C) (2016) (distinguishing between 
hedging and speculative proprietary trading); Dodd-Frank §716, 15 U.S.C. § 8305(a) 
(repealed 2014) (exempting financial institutions from being considered swap dealers if 
derivatives used swaps for hedging purposes). 
  
396 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 22 
regulation.133  Financial institutions would be able to manage their risk in 
the way best suited to their companies.134  Speculative derivative 
transactions that have no risk management value would still be required 
to meet the Section 23A covered transaction requirements.135  Exempting 
hedging transactions from Section 23A’s standards would encourage the 
types of activities that enhance banks’ risk management policies while 
also discouraging derivative transactions that have greater risk.136  
B. Reduction of Systemic Risk 
After the financial crisis, Congress passed Dodd-Frank with a 
stated goal of “promot[ing] the financial stability of the United States.”137  
However, holding derivative transactions for hedging purposes to the 
same requirements as speculative transactions under Section 23A runs 
counter to that aim.138  By subjecting derivative affiliate transactions to 
such requirements, Dodd-Frank discourages banks from entering into 
hedging transactions with affiliated parties.139  This leads to banks 
increasingly looking to third parties for hedging derivative trades rather 
than their own affiliates.140  Using third parties for hedging derivative 
transactions spreads the leverage of the derivative trade throughout the 
market rather than within a bank’s own affiliates.141  Spreading leverage 
of a derivative trade throughout the market increases systemic risk in the 
financial market, as “liquidity shock at one bank is more likely to cause 
 
 133. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (emphasizing that because of amendments, if a 
bank chooses to follow such a risk management strategy, it is severely limited by the 10% 
limitation imposed by Section 23A). 
 134. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21. 
 135. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2016). 
 136. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55 (implying that Volcker and Lincoln Exemptions 
allowed banks to maintain these risk management policies). 
 137. Dodd-Frank § 1376. 
 138. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55 (“Section 608 seems at odds with the overall 
purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act to reduce systemic risk to the financial services industry; 
Section 608 will inadvertently encourage banks to enter into hedging transactions with other 
nonaffiliated entities, thereby increasing the intertwined relationships and systemic risks 
among banks.”). 
 139. CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55. 
 140. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55 (“The application of . . . quantitative limit[s], 
coupled with the imposition of collateral requirements – with no exemption for bona fide 
hedging transactions – may lead some banks to enter into hedging transactions with third 
parties rather than with affiliates, simply in order to preserve the bank’s 23A quantitative limit 
capacity.”). 
 141. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21. 
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liquidity problems at other connected banks because the same shock is 
spread over fewer banks and is therefore larger and more 
destabilizing.”142  The more parties that are involved in a derivative 
transaction, the greater the systemic risk to the financial markets.143 
Exempting good-faith risk-mitigating derivative hedging 
transactions from Section 23A covered transaction standards reduces 
concerns over systemic risk.144  This is because it reduces the number of 
intertwined derivatives in the market by encouraging derivative 
transactions in-house rather than with third-parties.145  If banks are 
encouraged to use risk management practices such as the central hedging 
entity, they will hedge their transactions without tying third-parties to the 
derivatives.146  Keeping hedging derivatives attached to an affiliate will 
allow all the benefits of flexible risk management procedures, while also 
reducing systemic risk.147 
C. Easing the Compliance Burden 
In addition to the increased systemic risk and reduction of risk 
management strategies, the inclusion of derivative transactions for 
hedging as covered transactions increases the compliance burden, 
specifically with Section 23A’s Attribution Rule.148  The Attribution Rule 
of Section 23A may now apply to certain affiliate derivative transactions, 
which creates a difficult and expensive compliance burden on the 
banks.149  The Attribution Rule states that any transaction with a company 
is treated as a transaction with an affiliate of such company “to the extent 
the proceeds of the transaction are used for the benefit of, or transferred 
 
 142. Janet L. Yellen, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Interconnectedness and Systemic 
Risk: Lessons from the Financial Crisis and Policy Implications, Address at the American 
Economic Association/American Finance Association Joint Luncheon (Jan. 4, 2013). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55 (inversing the theory that derivative transactions 
increase systemic risk if the current rule remains in place). 
 145. CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55. 
 146. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (explaining that a lack of risk management 
flexibility to use central derivative entities will actually increase systemic risk by tying banks 
to one another in a greater amount). 
 147. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21. 
 148. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(2) (2016); see Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (arguing that 
many more regulations kick into place when following under covered transaction). 
 149. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21. 
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to, that affiliate.”150  This was included in Section 23A to prevent a bank 
from evading the restrictions in the section by using intermediaries and 
to limit the exposure that a bank had to customers of affiliates of the 
bank.151  Under Section 23A, if a borrower obtains a loan from a bank 
and uses the proceeds to make a payment to an affiliate of the bank, the 
loan is considered a covered transaction under the Attribution Rule.152  
A larger problem, however, is that the Attribution Rule applies 
even where the bank does not have knowledge that the proceeds of its 
preexisting loan—or other transaction—have been used to make 
payments to its affiliate.153  With the addition of derivatives as covered 
transactions, the Attribution Rule now “ostensibly extends” to any 
derivative payment made by a bank to a third party where the third party 
has a separate obligation to the bank’s affiliate.154  Even if trade proceeds 
are not “transferred to” the affiliate, there is still a risk that the transaction 
is made “for the benefit of” the affiliate.155  This Rule was never intended 
by the FRB to apply to derivative transactions, as derivative transactions 
were specifically left out of the requirements of covered transactions 
under Regulation W.156  With the inclusion of derivative transactions, the 
Attribution Rule now greatly increases compliance risks and can create 
both an accounting and monitoring nightmare.157  This rule complicates 
even the most basic derivative transactions with third parties and makes 
compliance extremely difficult.158 
 
 150. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(2) (2016). 
 151. See Transactions Between Banks and Their Affiliates, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,185, 24,190 
(May 11, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 223 (“This ‘attribution rule’ was included in 
section 23A to prevent a bank from evading the restrictions in the section by using 
intermediaries and to limit the exposure that a bank has to customers of affiliates of the 
bank.”). 
 152. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(2) (2016). 
 153. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21. 
 154. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21. 
 155. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21. 
 156. BD. OF GOV. OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ADOPTION OF REGULATION W IMPLEMENTING 
SECTIONS 23A AND 23B OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT (Jan. 9, 2003) (“The final rule does 
not subject credit exposure arising from bank-affiliate derivatives to the quantative limits and 
collateral requirements of Section 23A.”). 
 157. See DIXON HUGHES GOODMAN LLP, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION W (Sept. 2004), 
http://www2.dhgllp.com/res_pubs/RAS-Reg-W-Article.pdf (“This nuance provides for a lot 
of interpretation risks on behalf of banks and can create both an accounting and monitoring 
nightmare.”). 
 158. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (explaining that because the Attribution Rule 
applies even when a bank has no knowledge that the proceeds of its preexisting loan (or other 
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Exempting hedging derivative transactions from Section 23A 
covered transaction requirements will save money and will reduce 
monitoring issues, as these hedging transactions will no longer fall within 
the Attribution Rule.159  Exempting such transactions would eliminate 
costs and issues involved with compliance.160  At the same time, however, 
the goals of Dodd-Frank will still be met, as speculative derivative trades 
will still be monitored and complied with under the Attribution Rule.161 
V. CRAFTING THE EXEMPTION 
A. A Federal Reserve Interpretation 
As discussed, an exemption for derivative transactions whose 
purpose is for good-faith hedging and risk management reasons is 
beneficial for risk management, systemic, and compliance reasons.162  
Although Congress could take it upon themselves to specify that the 
standards that apply for derivative transactions under Section 23A do not 
apply to hedging transactions, it is far more likely and easier for the FRB 
to take action through an update of Regulation W in light of the changes 
to Section 23A in Dodd-Frank.163  Updating Regulation W would allow 
the FRB to define the meaning of “credit exposure” under the 
regulation.164  In determining the definition, the FRB should specify that 
credit exposure is only created between a member bank and its affiliate 
by derivative transactions made for non-hedging purposes.165 This would 
exempt derivative trades for hedging purposes from the standards of 
 
transaction) have been used to make payments to its affiliate, it will be almost impossible to 
know if the bank is in compliance or not). 
 159. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (emphasizing that not treating hedging 
derivatives differently creates cost and monitoring issues). 
 160. See DIXON HUGHES GOODMAN LLP, supra note 157 (explaining as currently 
structured, Section 23A can be costly and troublesome minefield). 
 161. See Infra Part V.B. 
 162. Supra Part IV. 
 163. Bruce, supra note 104. 
 164. See Bruce, supra note 104 (stating that Federal Reserve may merely interpret or issue 
rules, and are not required to pass a new bill). 
 165. See supra Part IV (explaining that the benefits of derivative transactions for hedging 
purposes are being excluded from Section 23A covered transaction standards). 
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covered transactions under Section 23A, as only derivative transactions 
causing credit exposure are subject to Section 23A policies.166  
Although no action has yet been taken, the FRB has considered a 
“consistent” definition of credit exposure to apply not only to affiliate 
derivative transactions, but also to apply to some other credit 
exposures.167  It is unclear if a desire for a wider approach will affect the 
thinking of the definition under Section 23A, but such an interpretation 
should refrain from casting a wide net in regards to what applies to credit 
exposure.168  A broader definition will include derivative transactions for 
hedging purposes, continuing current practice.169  If instead the definition 
is restricted to only speculative derivative transactions, hedging 
derivative transactions would be exempted from the requirements of 
Section 23A.170  Such a position would be both beneficial and consistent 
with the Dodd-Frank Act.171  
B. Consistent with Dodd-Frank’s Other Risk-Mitigating 
Exemptions 
Language that is consistent with exempting risk-mitigating 
derivative transactions from higher regulatory standards can be found 
elsewhere in Dodd-Frank.172  In the Volcker Rule,173 Congress created an 
exception to the ban on proprietary trading and private equity and hedge 
fund investing so long as the transactions are made for “risk-mitigating 
hedging activities . . . designed to reduce the specific risks to the banking 
entity in connection with and related to such positions, contracts, or other 
 
 166. See 12 U.S.C §371c(b)(7)(G) (“a derivative transaction . . . with an affiliate, to the 
extent that the transaction causes a member bank or a subsidiary to have credit exposure to 
the affiliate.”). 
 167. Bruce, supra note 104. 
 168. See Omarova, supra note 81, at 1765 (“[A]gency action will ultimately determine 
whether this provision of the Dodd-Frank Act affects any real change in large banking 
organizations’ derivatives dealing and trading.”). 
 169. Omarova, supra note 81. at 1765. 
 170. Omarova, supra note 81, at 1765. 
 171. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(C) (2016). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, CLIENT ALERT: THE VOLCKER 
RULE (last visited Oct. 10, 2017) https://files.skadden.com/newsletters%2FFSR_The_V 
olcker_Rule.pdf (“The ‘Volcker Rule’ prohibits an insured depository institution and its 
affiliates from: engaging in ‘proprietary trading;’ acquiring or retaining any equity, 
partnership, or other ownership interest in a hedge fund or private equity fund; and sponsoring 
a hedge fund or a private equity fund.”). 
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holdings.”174  This exemption establishes that transactions made with the 
intent of mitigating risk are the types of transactions that Congress sought 
to encourage, while those speculative—and inherently riskier—
transactions should be subject to higher regulatory standards.175  The 
intent of the trade was Congress’ primary concern.176   
The Volcker Rule was not the only provision of Dodd-Frank to 
include such an exemption.177  The since-repealed Lincoln Amendment, 
also known as the “swaps-pushout rule,” eliminated federal assistance to 
any swaps dealers that traded in speculative derivative transactions.178  
Similar to the Volcker Rule, the Lincoln Amendment exempted financial 
institutions that would otherwise be considered swaps dealers so long as 
they limited their derivative trading activities to hedging and other similar 
risk-mitigating measures.179  This allowed financial institutions that use 
derivatives to hedge—sometimes via affiliates—from being considered a 
swaps dealer, as Congress sought to encourage hedging derivatives 
activity while more closely monitoring and regulating speculative 
trading.180  In fact, this exception was added in conference to address 
concerns raised by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 
Chairman Sheila Bair and FRB Chairman Ben Bernanke that the Lincoln 
Amendment would be harmful to the financial industry by forbidding 
firms to use swaps and other derivatives as a part of their risk 
management structure.181  Again, an exclusion was allowed based on the 
intent of the derivative-trading party.182  
 
 174. Dodd-Frank § 619; 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(C) (2016). 
 175. SCOTT CAMMARN ET AL., CADWALADER WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, CLIENT ALERT: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S VOLCKER RULE (Oct. 15, 2010) http://
www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/an-analysis-of-the-dodd-frank-acts-
volcker-rule [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF VOLKER RULE]. 
 176. See id. (“The language suggests that motives of the banking entity 
when initially acquiring the security or instrument are highly relevant.”). 
 177. See 15 U.S.C. § 8305(a) (repealed 2014) (exempting risk-mitigating hedging 
activities). 
 178. 15 U.S.C. §8305(a) (repealed 2014). 
 179. Id. § 8305(d)(1)(A). 
 180. Id. 
 181. SCOTT CAMMARN ET AL., CADWALADER WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, CLIENT ALERT: 
THE LINCOLN AMENDMENT: BANKS, SWAP DEALERS, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND THE FUTURE 
OF THE AMENDMENT, (Dec. 14, 2010), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g= 
6d4652ef-84ac-4750-ab3a-3f22727ccbb6. 
 182. See ANALYSIS OF VOLKER RULE, supra note 176 (“The language suggests 
that motives of the banking entity when initially acquiring the security or instrument are 
highly relevant.”). 
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With both amendments, Congress actively sought to ensure that 
using a derivative transaction as a risk-mitigating activity remained 
available without higher regulatory standards to financial institutions.183  
This was both for the benefit of banks as well as in the interest of limiting 
systemic risk.184  Congress looked to the intent of the party making the 
derivative transaction to determine if such a transaction needed higher 
regulatory standards.185  
C. Defining Credit Exposure 
One of the chief concerns with the Volcker Rule’s exemption for 
risk-mitigating activities is that it is far too open to interpretation being 
that it is based on the intent of the parties, rather than following clear, 
black-letter rules.186  Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, has said 
that under the Volcker Rule, “you have to have a lawyer and a psychiatrist 
sitting next to you determining what was your intent every time you did 
something.”187  This concern is based on the regulatory language of the 
Volcker Rule, which requires that an exempted risk-mitigating 
transaction be “designed to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate and 
demonstrably reduces or otherwise significantly mitigates one or more 
specific, identifiable risks.”188  The “designed to” language is the intent 
of the parties, which is a clear grey area.189 
Such language would not be ideal in the interpretation of credit 
exposure by the FRB.190  In many derivative transactions, it is unclear 
whether the transacting parties are making a trade for speculative or 
hedging purposes.191  As such, in drafting an interpretation of credit 
 
 183. CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55. 
 184. CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55. 
 185. See ANALYSIS OF VOLKER RULE, supra note 176 (“The language suggests 
that motives of the banking entity when initially acquiring the security or instrument are 
highly relevant.”). 
 186. ANALYSIS OF VOLKER RULE, supra note 176. 
 187. Dan Fitzpatrick & Scott Patterson, Dimon Applauds Certainty with Final Volcker 
Rule, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2013) https://www.wsj.com/articles/dimon-says-jp-morgan-will-
spend-2-billion-on-controls-in-2014-1386769150. 
 188. 12 C.F.R. § 44.5(b)(2)(ii) (2017). 
 189. Thilo Schweizer, Volker Rule Approved, INST. OF INT’L FIN. (Jan. 2014) https://
www.iif.com/system/files/volcker_rule_approved_feb2014.pdf. 
 190. See id. (explaining that there is still considerable room for interpretation of the scope 
of the exemptions). 
 191. See generally Hazen, supra note 33 (providing an in-depth discussion of the 
derivative products). 
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exposure to allow derivative transactions for hedging and risk-mitigating 
purposes, the FRB should make its best efforts to clearly identify what 
types of derivative transactions would be considered for purposes of 
hedging and risk-mitigating transactions.192  However, even if a clearer 
interpretation is impossible, the opening of a grey area of regulatory 
interpretation would still be an improvement from completely banning 
such transactions.193   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Unlike other aspects of Dodd-Frank, the amendments to Section 
23A do not include an exception for hedging derivative transactions 
between affiliates.194  Congress should have included such an 
exemption.195  Derivative hedging transactions with affiliates play a 
major role in how a financial institution manages risk and credit 
exposure.196  These financial institutions manage the market risk by 
having an affiliate acquire the hedging asset, then bridge the hedge to the 
parent company.197  This limits systemic risk by insuring against the 
failure of the underlying asset within the overall company structure, 
rather than transacting with unaffiliated entities.198  These transactions 
are important for risk management in the financial industry and are the 
types of transactions that regulators should be encouraging rather than 
rendering more costly and difficult.199  Derivatives may be mistrusted 
creatures, but a regulatory body that encourages better risk management, 
no matter the financial instrument, is healthier for financial markets and 
economic stability.200  
The FRB should, in its eventual updated rule on affiliate 
transactions, interpret “credit exposure” as not applying to derivative 
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transactions between affiliates that are made in good-faith for hedging 
and risk-mitigating purposes.201  This would allow financial institutions 
to establish more flexible risk management profiles, reduce systemic risk, 
and ease the compliance maelstrom, all while maintaining the strict 
regulatory oversight of speculative derivative transactions.202  Despite 
potential issues in its application, such an interpretation would still be in 
the best interests of the industry and financial markets.203  Congress has 
already used this type of exception within Dodd-Frank and should again 
do so with affiliate transactions.204  Hedging derivative transactions are 
used to protect banks from risks, and accordingly should not treated like 
the “financial weapons of mass destruction” described by Warren 
Buffet.205 
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